Mehri Madarshahi｜“新的戰爭外交”：為何現代沖突不再終結——而只是暫停

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【導讀】美伊簽署停戰諒解備忘錄不到一個月，雙方重燃戰火。伊朗宣布關閉霍爾木茲海峽，美國則宣布恢復對伊朗實施海上封鎖。隨著空襲、導彈與無人機攻擊不斷升級，美伊對抗正顯現出反復化、長期化的跡象。

近年來，類似情形已在多場沖突中反復出現。從俄烏戰場到加沙、蘇丹，停火安排與外交斡旋屢屢啟動，卻始終難以轉化為持久的政治解決：有的停而未止，長期徘徊于低烈度沖突之中；有的和而未定，在短暫平靜后再起兵戎。為何當下越來越多的沖突難以通過一紙協議終結？在戰爭與和平之間，外交努力是否正在扮演一種不同以往的角色？

在IPP榮譽教授梅赫里·馬達爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）看來，二十一世紀的外交正在從終結戰爭的工具，逐漸演變為管理戰爭、控制沖突節奏的機制；所謂“暫時和平”，并非真正消除戰略對抗，而是在暫停暴力、遏制升級和保留政治解決可能性的同時，為各方重新評估風險、恢復戰略能力并決定下一步行動爭取時間。她指出，現代外交談判的不僅是和平，也是時間，其成效不僅應以是否實現持久和平來衡量，也應以是否成功控制沖突、防止下一輪戰爭過早爆發來衡量。

戰爭的新外交為何現代沖突不再終結——而只是暫停

The New Diplomacy of War
Why Modern Conflicts No Longer End—They Pause

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·馬達爾沙希）

IPP榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

炮聲余音未散，便又再次轟鳴。

The guns had barely fallen silent before they spoke again.

美國與伊朗于2026年6月17日簽署《伊斯蘭堡諒解備忘錄》僅數周后，敵對行動便重新開始。這份文件曾被許多人視為一項重大的外交突破，本來有望終結近年來最危險的對抗之一。然而，空襲隨即升級，軍事威脅再度出現，政治指責取代了外交上的樂觀情緒。那份原本承諾為局勢降級開辟道路的協議，最終似乎只是在一場尚未結束的沖突中，劃出了一段短暫的間歇。

Only weeks after the United States and Iran signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (17 June 2026), a document welcomed by many as a diplomatic breakthrough capable of ending one of the most dangerous confrontations in recent years, hostilities resumed. Air strikes intensified. Military threats returned. Political accusations replaced diplomatic optimism. The agreement that had promised to open a path toward de-escalation appeared instead to have marked only a brief interruption in an unfinished conflict.

美國中央司令部公布的行動記錄顯示，本輪連續對伊打擊自7月11日晚展開；至美國東部時間7月19日晚，美軍已完成連續第九個夜間行動。美方稱，打擊目標包括伊朗軍事指揮中心、防空與沿海監視設施、導彈和無人機儲存及發射地點、海上軍事能力、通信網絡和軍事后勤設施。圖源：路透社

乍看之下，原因似乎并不復雜。備忘錄本身并不完整：部分條款缺乏明確性，另一些條款則在很大程度上依賴政治善意，而若干關鍵問題仍未得到解決。尤其是第五條，其基礎是若干特定假設；然而，一旦戰略互不信任重新浮現，這些假設很快便被證明難以維系。

At first glance, the explanation seems straightforward. The memorandum was incomplete. Some of its provisions lacked precision, others relied heavily on political goodwill, and key issues remained unresolved. Article 5, in particular, rested on assumptions that quickly proved difficult to sustain once strategic mistrust resurfaced.

然而，也許我們提出了錯誤的問題。

Yet perhaps we are asking the wrong question.

與其追問這項協議為何失敗，我們或許更應當問：為什么它從一開始所帶來的，就只是一種暫時和平？

Instead of asking why this agreement failed, we might ask why it produced only a temporary peace in the first place.

這個問題所涉及的，遠不止華盛頓與德黑蘭之間的對抗。縱觀當今地緣政治格局，越來越多的戰爭似乎都在遵循一種驚人相似的模式：戰事升級至危險程度，國際壓力不斷加大，外交官展開談判，隨后宣布停火、人道主義暫停，或簽署某項備忘錄。世界短暫地開始談論和平。數周或數月之后，軍事行動再次展開，其手段往往比此前更加精密，有時烈度也更為驚人。

This question extends far beyond the confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Across today's geopolitical landscape, an increasing number of wars appear to follow a remarkably similar pattern. Fighting reaches a dangerous intensity. International pressure mounts. Diplomats negotiate. A ceasefire, humanitarian pause, or memorandum is announced. The world briefly speaks of peace. Weeks or months later, military operations resume, often with greater sophistication and sometimes with greater intensity than before.

烏克蘭、加沙、黎巴嫩、也門、美國與伊朗。沖突各不相同，參與者各不相同，政治環境也各不相同，外交節奏卻呈現出驚人的相似性。

Ukraine. Gaza. Lebanon. Yemen. The United States and Iran. Different conflicts, different actors, different political circumstances, but a strikingly similar diplomatic rhythm.

俄總統新聞秘書佩斯科夫近期表示，俄羅斯最初發動的“特別軍事行動”（SVO）已因西方國家的深度介入而演變為“真正的戰爭”。圖源：路透社

幾代人以來，外交一直被視為連接戰爭與和平的橋梁。談判旨在通過處理沖突背后的政治根源，并建立持久的解決方案來終結戰爭。衡量外交是否成功，取決于它能否將戰場轉化為談判桌，將停火轉化為持久協議。

For generations, diplomacy was understood as the bridge between war and peace. Negotiations sought to terminate conflicts by addressing their political causes and creating durable settlements. The success of diplomacy was measured by its ability to transform battlefields into negotiating tables and ceasefires into lasting agreements.

然而，二十一世紀或許正在見證一種不同的現象。外交也許已不再主要是終結戰爭的工具。它或許正日益成為管理戰爭的機制。

The twenty-first century may be witnessing a different phenomenon.Perhaps diplomacy is no longer functioning primarily as the instrument through which wars end. Perhaps it is increasingly becoming the mechanism through which wars are managed.

這種可能性進一步引出了一個更具挑戰性的問題：臨時性外交協議的作用，是否可能超越政治妥協本身？它們是否也為各國政府提供了所需的戰略時間，使其得以補充導彈庫存、恢復軍事戰備、擴大工業生產、重新評估作戰計劃、鞏固聯盟，并為下一階段的對抗做好準備？

This possibility raises a more provocative question. What if temporary diplomatic agreements serve purposes beyond political compromise? What if they also provide governments with the strategic time required to replenish missile inventories, restore military readiness, expand industrial production, reassess operational plans, strengthen alliances, and prepare for the next phase of confrontation?

如果事實果真如此，那么外交便獲得了一種在傳統國際關系理論中鮮少得到承認的功能。外交不再僅僅作為戰爭的解藥而置身于戰爭之外，而是可能日益進入戰爭本身——它所調節的是戰爭的節奏，而不是決定戰爭的終局。

If so, diplomacy has acquired a function rarely acknowledged in traditional international relations. Rather than standing outside war as its antidote, diplomacy may increasingly operate within war itself-regulating its tempo rather than determining its conclusion.

本文并非主張每一次停火談判都是為了便利重新武裝，也不是說人道主義或政治考量已經退居次要地位。這樣的論斷只會將遠為復雜的現實過度簡單化。本文真正要追問的是：二十一世紀戰爭在經濟與工業層面發生的變化，是否已悄然改變了外交最古老的職能之一？在一個高技術沖突消耗先進武器的速度往往快于其補充速度的時代，談判本身是否已經成為現代戰爭作戰節奏的一部分？

This article does not argue that every ceasefire is negotiated to facilitate rearmament, nor that humanitarian or political considerations have become secondary. Such claims would oversimplify a far more complex reality. It asks instead whether the changing economics and industrial realities of twenty-first-century warfare have quietly transformed one of diplomacy's oldest purposes. In an age where technologically advanced conflicts consume sophisticated weapons faster than they can often be replaced, have negotiations themselves become part of the operational rhythm of modern war?

如果這個問題令人不安，那是因為它挑戰了國際政治中一個最為持久的基本假設：和平是戰爭的對立面。

If that question seems unsettling, it is because it challenges one of the most enduring assumptions of international politics: that peace represents the opposite of war.

也許在今天，和平已經成為另一種存在。也許，它已經成為一段間歇。

Perhaps today, peace has become something else.Perhaps it has become an interval.

7月3日到9日，伊朗為已故最高領袖哈梅內伊安排了長達一周的悼念儀式。國葬期間，數百萬哀悼者涌上德黑蘭街頭，為已故伊朗最高領袖哈梅內伊送行。圖源：Getty Images

無法維系的協議

The Agreement That Could Not Hold

美國與伊朗之間重新爆發的對抗，引出了一個遠遠超出這場沖突本身的問題：一項曾被國際社會譽為重大外交突破的協議，為何連一段相對短暫的戰略穩定都無法維持？

The renewed confrontation between the United States and Iran raises a question that extends well beyond the conflict itself. Why did an agreement welcomed internationally as a significant diplomatic breakthrough prove incapable of sustaining even a relatively short period of strategic stability?

乍看之下，答案似乎十分明確。《伊斯蘭堡諒解備忘錄》從來就不是一項旨在發揮全面和平條約作用的文件。它是在軍事局勢極度緊張的條件下談判達成的，其直接目標是停止敵對行動、降低局勢進一步升級的風險，并為繼續談判創造政治空間。若以這些近期目標來衡量，該備忘錄無疑是一項重要的外交成果。它表明，即使在對抗最激烈之際，兩個長期敵對的國家之間仍然存在對話的可能；同時，它也成功地——至少是暫時地——遏止了軍事局勢的迅速惡化。

At first sight, the answer appears straightforward. The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding was never intended to serve as a comprehensive peace treaty. It was negotiated under conditions of extreme military tension with the immediate objective of halting hostilities, reducing the risks of further escalation, and creating political space for continued negotiations. Judged against those immediate objectives, the Memorandum represented an important diplomatic achievement. It demonstrated that dialogue between two long-standing adversaries remained possible even at the height of confrontation and succeeded, at least temporarily, in interrupting a rapidly deteriorating military situation.

然而，敵對行動的重新爆發說明，中止暴力與化解戰略對抗，并不一定是同一回事。

Yet the renewed outbreak of hostilities suggests that interrupting violence and resolving strategic rivalry are not necessarily the same thing.

在審視第五條的主要內容時，這一區別顯得尤為重要。該條涉及伊朗同意實行60天免收費通行、在30天內完成排雷和障礙清除，并與阿曼舉行雙邊行政磋商，以管理海上交通。《諒解備忘錄》所采用的措辭既無爭議，也合乎情理，體現了外交一貫追求的目標：保持克制、作出相互承諾，并期待雙方共同維持局勢降級的勢頭。無論是其目標還是其意圖，恐怕都很少有觀察者會提出質疑。

This distinction becomes particularly relevant when examining the key takeaways of Article 5 refering to Iran’s agreements to toll-free transit for 60 days, demining and obstacle removal within 30 days and bilateral administrative talks with Oman to manage maitime traffic. The MOU used a language which is neither controversial nor unreasonable, reflecting the traditional aspirations of diplomacy: restraint, reciprocal commitments, and the expectation that both parties will preserve the momentum towards de-escalation. Few observers would question either its objectives or its intentions.

近段時間，美軍連續空襲伊朗多地，尤其是伊朗南部沿海省份。其中，霍爾木茲海峽沿岸的霍爾木茲甘省遭空襲尤為密集。圖源：路透社

然而，該條款能否發揮實效，不僅取決于其文字表述，也取決于它所處并預期發揮作用的戰略環境。

Its effectiveness, however, depended not only upon its language but also upon the strategic environment in which it is expected to operate.

因此，有四個問題值得認真思考。

Four questions therefore deserve careful consideration.

第一，第五條是否預設了雙方之間已經具備某種程度的戰略互信，而這種互信事實上尚未形成？

First, does Article 5 assume a level of strategic trust that does not yet exist between the parties?

第二，它是否只是推遲了引發沖突的根本分歧，而非真正加以解決？

Second, does it postpone rather than resolve the fundamental sources of disagreement that produced the conflict?

第三，它是否主要依賴各方自愿履行，卻缺乏足夠有力的核查與執行機制？

Third, does it rely primarily upon voluntary compliance without sufficiently robust mechanisms for verification or enforcement?

最后，它是否能夠適應迅速變化的軍事與戰略環境？在這樣的環境中，政治現實與作戰態勢的演變速度，可能遠遠快于外交承諾所能跟進的速度。

Finally, is it capable of adapting to rapidly changing military and strategic conditions in which political and operational realities may evolve far more rapidly than diplomatic commitments?

這些問題不應被理解為對第五條本身的批評。它們所反映的，是任何由戰略對手談判達成的外交協議都會面臨的更廣泛挑戰，尤其是在各方根本政治目標并未發生實質變化的情況下。事實上，這份備忘錄似乎確實實現了它原本希望達到的目標：降低局勢立即升級的危險，重新開啟溝通渠道，并為外交取代軍事對抗創造機會——盡管這種取代僅僅維持了很短時間。

These questions should not be understood as criticisms of Article 5 itself. They reflected the broader challenges confronting any diplomatic agreement negotiated between strategic rivals whose underlying political objectives remain fundamentally unchanged. Indeed, the Memorandum appears to have achieved precisely what it was designed to accomplish: it reduced the immediate danger of escalation, reopened channels of communication, and created an opportunity for diplomacy to replace military confrontation, however only briefly.

更困難的問題在于：人們是否本就不應合理期待此類協議能夠取得更多成果？

The more difficult question is whether any agreement of this nature could reasonably have been expected to accomplish more.

這份備忘錄的首要目的，究竟是化解美國與伊朗之間的戰略對抗？還是在穩定一場危險危機的同時，將更為棘手的政治問題留待今后的談判解決？

Was the primary purpose of the Memorandum to resolve the strategic rivalry between the United States and Iran? Or was its more immediate objective to stabilize a dangerous crisis while postponing the more difficult political questions for future negotiation?

這一區別并非純粹的學術問題。它指向了對外交本身的兩種不同理解。

The distinction is not merely academic. It points to two different understandings of diplomacy itself.

一種理解，是通過處理沖突背后的政治根源并達成持久解決方案來化解沖突。另一種理解，則是在根本性對抗仍未解決的情況下，通過降低眼前風險、遏制局勢升級并保留繼續對話的機會來管理沖突。

One seeks to resolve conflict by addressing its political causes and producing a durable settlement. The other seeks to manage conflict by reducing immediate risks, containing escalation, and preserving opportunities for continued dialogue even when the underlying rivalry remains unresolved.

《伊斯蘭堡諒解備忘錄》的經歷本身并不足以證明外交正在發生變化，也不會削弱外交接觸在防止沖突進一步擴大方面的價值。然而，它確實引出了一個更為廣泛的問題：如果此類協議越來越多地能夠暫停暴力，卻無法解決導致暴力產生的戰略競爭，那么，我們是否仍應僅僅將它們視為邁向和平但尚未完成的步驟？還是說，它們實際上反映了一種正在形成的外交實踐——一種為適應不同地緣政治現實而出現的外交實踐？

The experience of the Islamabad Memorandum does not, by itself, establish that diplomacy is changing. Nor does it diminish the value of diplomatic engagement in preventing wider conflict. It does, however, invite a broader inquiry. If agreements of this kind increasingly succeed in suspending violence without resolving the strategic competition that produced it, should they be regarded simply as incomplete steps towards peace, or do they reflect an emerging diplomatic practice adapted to a different geopolitical reality?

美伊備忘錄并沒有回答這個問題。它只是迫使我們不得不提出這個問題。要判斷這一經歷究竟只是一個孤立案例，還是更廣泛趨勢的一部分，就有必要把目光投向伊朗之外。

The U.S.-Iran Memorandum does not answer that question.It simply compels us to ask it.To determine whether this experience represents an isolated case or part of a wider pattern, it is necessary to look beyond Iran.

伊朗之外Beyond Iran

如果《伊斯蘭堡諒解備忘錄》的失效只是一起孤立事件，那么或許可以將其歸因于華盛頓與德黑蘭之間特殊而漫長的互不信任歷史。然而，在截然不同的地區，外交一次又一次地限制了暴力，卻未能徹底解決引發這些暴力的爭端。

If the collapse of the Islamabad Memorandum were an isolated episode, it might be explained by the particular history of mistrust between Washington and Tehran. Yet across very different regions, diplomacy has repeatedly limited violence without fully resolving the disputes from which it emerged.

在蘇丹，區域和國際社會先后開展了多輪調解，提出人道主義休戰、停火以及政治過渡方案。這些努力有時確實開啟了談判渠道，但主要交戰方在軍事控制權、政治權力以及國家未來架構等問題上仍存在嚴重分歧。即使新的和平倡議正在討論之中，戰斗也從未真正停止。

In Sudan, successive regional and international mediation efforts have proposed humanitarian truces, ceasefires and political transitions. They have occasionally opened channels for negotiation, but the principal belligerents remain divided over military control, political authority and the future structure of the state. Fighting has continued even while new peace initiatives have been under discussion.

近日，聯合國兒童基金會就蘇丹局勢發布最新報告指出，蘇丹中西部達爾富爾地區和科爾多凡地區局勢持續嚴峻，兒童傷亡情況最為嚴重。其中，無人機襲擊造成了約60%的兒童傷亡。圖源：CNN

柬埔寨與泰國之間的邊境爭端提供了另一個不同的例子。外交介入和停火安排有助于遏制武裝沖突，防止對抗進一步擴大。然而，雙方在領土問題上的分歧、歷史積怨，以及對爭端解決方式的不同主張始終懸而未決，使一輪又一輪的安排始終容易受到緊張局勢再度升級的沖擊。

The border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand offers a different example. Diplomatic intervention and ceasefire arrangements have helped contain armed clashes and prevent a wider confrontation. Yet the territorial disagreements, historical grievances and competing approaches to their resolution have remained unsettled, leaving successive arrangements vulnerable to renewed tension.

2025年7月24日，泰國和柬埔寨爆發了十多年來最血腥的軍事沖突，雙方動用坦克、火炮和地面部隊在爭議邊界地區交戰。圖源：法新社

哥倫比亞則提供了一個更為復雜，也更具啟示意義的案例。2016年，哥倫比亞政府與“哥倫比亞革命武裝力量”達成和平協議，結束了該國長期內部沖突中的一個重要階段，并使暴力水平實現了顯著而持久的下降。因此，不應將其描述為一次外交失敗。然而，協議落實不充分、其他武裝團體持續存在、非法經濟活動延續，以及國家權力薄弱地區的暴力問題，都說明一項協議可以解決某一場沖突，卻未必能夠消除維系更廣泛不安全局勢的深層條件。

Colombia presents a more complex and instructive case. The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC ended a major chapter of the country’s long internal conflict and produced important, durable reductions in violence. It should therefore not be portrayed as a diplomatic failure. Nevertheless, incomplete implementation, the persistence of other armed groups, illicit economies and violence in territories where state authority remains weak demonstrate that an agreement can resolve one conflict without eliminating the wider conditions that sustain insecurity.

朝鮮半島或許為“停止戰爭”與“解決戰爭”之間的區別提供了最清晰的歷史例證。1953年的停戰協定結束了大規模敵對行動，并在七十多年間避免了全面戰爭再次爆發。然而，它始終未被正式和平條約所取代，潛藏其下的政治與戰略對抗至今仍未解決。這些案例之間存在根本差異。蘇丹經歷的是內戰；柬埔寨與泰國面對的是領土爭端；哥倫比亞在和平建設取得成功的同時，武裝暴力仍在持續；朝鮮半島則長期處于一項表現出驚人持久性的停戰安排之下。我們既不應將它們等同視之，也不應強行用一種單一解釋來概括它們。

The Korean Peninsula provides perhaps the clearest historical illustration of the distinction between stopping a war and settling it. The 1953 Armistice ended large-scale hostilities and has prevented a return to full-scale war for more than seven decades. Yet it was never replaced by a formal peace treaty, and the underlying political and strategic confrontation remains unresolved. These cases differ profoundly. Sudan is a civil war; Cambodia and Thailand confront a territorial dispute; Colombia has combined successful peacebuilding with continuing armed violence; Korea remains governed by an armistice that has proved remarkably durable. They should neither be equated nor forced into a single explanation.

據朝鮮官方媒體日前報道，金正恩表示，朝鮮正在“為海軍配備核武器”，同時他還公布了建造1萬噸級戰艦的計劃。自2019年金正恩與特朗普在河內舉行的峰會因無核化范圍和解除制裁問題破裂以來，平壤已多次宣稱自己是“不可逆轉的”核國家。

然而，它們仍然揭示了一個共同的外交困境。

They nevertheless reveal a common diplomatic dilemma.

談判可以停止戰斗、減少苦難，并防止沖突蔓延。它甚至可能帶來持久的改善。但它并不總能解決那些可能再次引發對抗的政治、領土或戰略條件。

Negotiations may stop fighting, reduce suffering and prevent a conflict from spreading. They may even produce lasting improvements. But they do not alwaysresolve the political, territorial or strategic conditions capable of generating renewed confrontation.

這并不意味著外交通常只能產生暫時性結果。它更可能說明，當對抗已經根深蒂固時，外交成功可以呈現出多種形式：在一些情況下實現問題的解決，在另一些情況下形成長期遏制，而在雙方都尚未準備好、或無力解決根本爭端時，則實現暫時穩定。

This does not mean that diplomacy generally produces only temporary outcomes. It suggests instead that where rivalries are deeply entrenched, diplomatic success may assume several forms: resolution in some cases, prolonged containment in others, and temporary stabilization where neither side is prepared or able to settle the underlying dispute.

因此，問題并不僅僅是：為什么外交有時無法帶來和平？更重要的問題是：為什么在某些沖突中，暫停本身竟會成為外交所能取得的主要成果？

The question is, therefore, not simply why diplomacy sometimes fails to produce peace. It is why, in certain conflicts, the pause itself becomes the principal diplomatic achievement.

另一個問題

A Different Question

讓我再次強調，本文所要關注的，并不是當代戰爭為何如此難以終結，而是另一個因素是否同樣值得我們認真思考。

Let me emphasis once more that this article does not seek to focus on why contemporary wars are difficult to end but It asks whether a different factor may also deserve consideration.

毋庸置疑，在過去二十年間，戰爭形態經歷了深刻轉變。如今，現代沖突的走向日益不僅取決于戰場表現，也取決于一個國家能否在技術復雜性不斷提高、經濟約束日益加劇的條件下，維持長期軍事行動。精確制導武器、先進防空系統、無人機、網絡能力、情報網絡、衛星支援以及復雜的后勤體系，都已成為現代戰爭不可或缺的組成部分。然而，這些能力不僅成本高昂、技術要求嚴苛，其消耗速度往往也超過短期內所能補充的速度。

Needless to say that over the past two decades, warfare has undergone a profound transformation. Modern conflicts now a days, increasingly depend not only upon battlefield performance but upon the ability of a state to sustain prolonged military operations under conditions of growing technological complexity and economic constraint. Precision-guided munitions, sophisticated air-defence systems, drones, cyber capabilities, intelligence networks, satellite support and complex logistical systems have become indispensable components of modern warfare. They are also costly, technologically demanding and consumed at a pace that often exceeds immediate replacement.

近期烏克蘭明顯擴大了使用遠程無人機襲擊俄羅斯境內目標的規模、頻率和縱深。圖源：路透社

因此，今天的軍事力量不僅取決于一個國家擁有什么，也取決于它能夠恢復什么。

Military power today, therefore, depends not only upon what a state possesses, but also upon what it is capable of restoring.

為便于本文討論，我們可以將這種更廣泛的能力稱為“戰略能力”。它不僅包括軍事裝備與武器庫存，也包括工業生產、后勤保障、作戰準備、情報能力、技術適應、聯盟協調，以及維持長期戰略競爭所必需的政治與經濟資源。

For the purposes of this discussion, that broader capability may be described asstrategic capacity. It encompasses not only military inventories but also industrial production, logistics, operational readiness, intelligence, technological adaptation, alliance coordination and the political and economic resources required to sustain prolonged strategic competition.

從這一角度來看，臨時性外交安排可能同時發揮不止一種作用。它們可以降低局勢立即升級的風險，為人道主義救援創造條件，并重新開啟政治對話。與此同時，它們也可能為政府提供機會，使其在決定下一步行動之前，恢復自身戰略能力的某些組成部分。

Viewed from this perspective, temporary diplomatic arrangements may perform more than one function. They reduce the immediate risks of escalation, create opportunities for humanitarian relief and reopen political dialogue. At the same time, they may also provide governments with an opportunity to restore elements of their strategic capacity before deciding upon their next course of action.

不過，有必要在此作出說明：這一觀察不應被理解為各國進行停火談判，就是為了準備重新開戰；也不意味著每一次外交暫停背后都隱藏著軍事算計。這樣的結論既無法反映當代沖突的多樣性，也忽視了外交在實現持久政治解決方面依然具有的重要意義。

A point of caution: This observation should not be interpreted as suggesting that states negotiate ceasefires in order to prepare for renewed war, nor that every diplomatic pause conceals a military calculation. Such a conclusion would neither reflect the diversity of contemporary conflicts nor the continued importance of diplomacy in achieving lasting settlements.

本文提出的觀點要有限得多。

The proposition advanced here is more limited.

在主要戰略對手參與的沖突中，臨時性外交安排可能創造一種條件，使外交與戰略得以同時運作。一方面，談判試圖遏制局勢升級；另一方面，各國政府則重新評估軍事選項、鞏固聯盟、補充關鍵能力、調整作戰規劃，并判斷不斷變化的政治形勢。

In conflicts involving major strategic rivals, temporary diplomatic arrangements may create conditions under which both diplomacy and strategy operate simultaneously. Negotiations seek to contain escalation while governments reassess military options, strengthen alliances, replenish critical capabilities, adapt operational planning and evaluate changing political circumstances.

在這種條件下，外交并不取代戰略競爭。它與戰略競爭并存。

Under such conditions, diplomacy does not replace strategic competition. It coexists with it.

這種并存究竟只是對一個異常動蕩的地緣政治時期所作出的臨時調整，還是反映了國際事務中一種更為持久的演變，仍有待進一步思考。

Whether this coexistence represents a temporary adaptation to an exceptionally turbulent geopolitical period or reflects a more enduring evolution in international affairs needs also further reflections.

盡管如此，它至少說明，暫時和平所代表的，可能不僅僅是兩個沖突階段之間的間歇。

It nevertheless suggests that temporary peace may represent more than the interval between two phases of conflict.

這種可能性也促使我們在長期戰略競爭的背景下，以一種更為寬廣的方式理解外交。

This possibility invites possibly a broader understanding of diplomacy in periods of sustained strategic rivalry.

因此，暫時和平不應僅僅被視為兩個沖突階段之間的間隔。它也可能代表這樣一段時期：外交與戰略同時展開，各自追求不同、但未必相互矛盾的目標。外交致力于降低戰爭的即時風險；政府則力求保存或恢復必要的戰略能力，以便在對抗持續的情況下保護本國利益。

Temporary peace therefore need not be understood merely as the interval between two phases of conflict. It may also represent a period during which diplomacy and strategy operate simultaneously, each pursuing different, though not necessarily contradictory, objectives. Diplomacy seeks to reduce the immediate risks of war; governments seek to preserve or restore the strategic capacity required to protect their interests should confrontation continue.

如果事實果真如此，那么外交所談判的，就不僅僅是和平。它也在談判時間。

If so, diplomacy is not merely negotiating peace. It is also negotiating time.

4月11日星期六，在巴基斯坦伊斯蘭堡的一個媒體協調中心外，一名警察走過一塊關于美國和伊朗談判的廣告牌。

暫時和平的外交

The Diplomacy of Temporary Peace

幾個世紀以來，衡量外交成敗的首要標準始終只有一個：終結戰爭。和平協議標志著沖突的結束，使政治爭端取代軍事對抗。

For centuries, diplomacy was judged by one overriding ambition: to end wars. Peace agreements marked the conclusion of conflict, allowing political disputes to replace military confrontation.

然而，這一傳統認識已無法充分反映二十一世紀的戰略現實。

That assumption no longer fully reflects the strategic realities of the twenty-first century.

外交正日益被要求完成一種不同的使命。在一個長期地緣政治競爭不斷延續的國際體系中，談判往往并不終結戰略競爭，而只是將其暫時中斷。外交的目標已不再總是達成一項最終和平，而是在保留未來政治解決可能性的同時，防止對抗越過門檻，演變為失控的升級。

Increasingly, diplomacy is being asked to accomplish something different. In an international system marked by enduring geopolitical rivalries, negotiations often do not terminate strategic competition; they interrupt it. The objective is no longer always to produce a definitive peace, but to prevent confrontation from crossing the threshold into uncontrolled escalation while keeping open the possibility of a future political settlement.

這就是我所說的“暫時和平的外交”。

This is what I describe asthe diplomacy of temporary peace.

按照傳統意義，暫時和平既不能被簡單視為外交失敗，也不能被視為外交成功。它是一種不同的戰略狀態：暴力暫停了，但競爭依然存在；導彈或許停止發射，軍事規劃卻仍在繼續；停火開始生效，與此同時，聯盟得到鞏固，國防工業持續擴張，情報行動并未停止，各國政府既為談判作準備，也為談判可能失敗的局面作準備。

Temporary peace is neither diplomatic failure nor diplomatic success in its traditional sense. It is a different strategic condition. Violence is suspended, but rivalry survives. Missiles may stop flying, yet military planning continues. Ceasefires take hold, while alliances are strengthened, defence industries expand, intelligence operations continue and governments prepare simultaneously for negotiation and for the possibility that negotiations may fail.

在這一背景下，和平不再意味著戰略競爭的終結。它成為戰略競爭中的一個階段。

Peace, in this context, is no longer the end of strategic competition.It becomes one phase within it.

因此，暫時和平的目的未必是消除沖突，而可能是管理沖突。它所爭取的，不僅是外交所需要的時間，也是政府所需要的時間——用于溝通、遏制人道主義災難、安撫盟友、恢復戰略能力、重新評估風險，并最終判斷：重新展開對抗，還是重新啟動談判，更符合本國利益。

The purpose of temporary peace is therefore not necessarily to eliminate conflict, but to manage it. It buys time—not simply for diplomacy, but for governments. Time to communicate, to contain humanitarian catastrophe, to reassure allies, to restore strategic capacity, to reassess risks and, ultimately, to decide whether renewed confrontation or renewed negotiation better serves their national interests.

2026年7月8日，美國總統特朗普在土耳其安卡拉與烏克蘭總統澤連斯基舉行雙邊會晤，此次會晤與北約領導人峰會同期舉行。圖源：路透社

從這一角度來看，許多當代外交行動便具有了不同的意義。它們的重要性不僅在于解決了什么，也在于推遲了什么、遏制了什么，以及阻止了什么。衡量其成功與否，不能始終只看它們所帶來的和平能否永久維持，還應考察它們是否降低了沖突擴大并造成更大破壞的可能性。

Viewed in this light, many contemporary diplomatic initiatives acquire a different meaning. Their significance lies not only in what they resolve, but also in what they postpone, contain and prevent. Their success cannot always be measured by the permanence of the peace they produce, but by their ability to reduce the probability of a wider and more destructive conflict.

這并不意味著外交已經放棄對持久和平的追求。恰恰相反，達成持久的政治解決仍然是外交的最高目標。然而，當地緣政治競爭變得根深蒂固時，外交所能發揮作用的政治空間也日益狹窄。它一邊管理不穩定，一邊尋找穩定；它一邊推遲災難，一邊期待政治條件最終能夠允許各方達成更為持久的解決方案。

This does not mean that diplomacy has abandoned the search for lasting peace. On the contrary, durable political settlements remain its highest objective. But when geopolitical rivalry becomes deeply entrenched, diplomacy increasingly operates within narrower political margins. It manages instability while searching for stability. It postpones catastrophe while hoping that political conditions will eventually permit a more durable settlement.

暫時和平究竟會成為通向和解的橋梁，還是僅僅成為新一輪對抗之前的間歇，事先無法確定。這將取決于各方作出的政治選擇，而任何協議，無論起草得多么周密，都無法對此作出保證。

Whether temporary peace becomes a bridge to reconciliation or merely an interval before renewed confrontation cannot be known in advance. That will depend upon political choices that no agreement, however carefully drafted, can guarantee.

然而，越來越明顯的一點是，外交本身正在發生演變。在戰略競爭的時代，衡量外交的標準已不再只是它最終促成了怎樣的和平，還包括它成功遏制了哪些沖突。

What does appear increasingly evident, however, is that diplomacy itself is evolving. In an era of strategic competition, it is no longer judged solely by the peace it concludes, but also by the conflicts it succeeds in containing.

因此，二十一世紀的外交或許正面臨一個以往世代未曾經歷的悖論：它最偉大的成就，未必總是終結戰爭，而可能是防止下一場戰爭過早開始。

The diplomacy of the twenty-first century may therefore face a paradox unknown to earlier generations: its greatest achievement may not always be to end wars, but to prevent the next one from beginning too soon.

梅赫里·馬達爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽教授、聯合國教科文組織下屬國際創意和可持續發展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ;

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